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239 lines
12 KiB
YAML
239 lines
12 KiB
YAML
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# Saudi Compliance Register
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# السجل الرسمي للامتثال السعودي
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# This register is the single source of truth for Dealix's Saudi
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# compliance posture. Every control below is either:
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# IMPLEMENTED — enforced in code / infra
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# PLANNED — scheduled for a named phase
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# NOT_APPLICABLE — documented rationale required
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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schema_version: "1.0"
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last_reviewed: "2026-04-21"
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jurisdiction: "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"
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applicable_frameworks:
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- PDPL
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- SDAIA Controller/Processor Guide
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- NCA ECC 2-2024
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- NCA DCC-1:2022
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- NCA CCC 2:2024
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- NIST AI RMF 1.0
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- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# PDPL — Personal Data Protection Law
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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pdpl:
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data_inventory:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 0 (Day 0-30)"
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description: "Catalog all personal data processed, by type and source"
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owner: "Privacy & Trust Plane"
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evidence: []
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lawful_basis_register:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 0"
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description: "For every processing purpose, declare lawful basis: consent | contract | legal obligation | legitimate interest"
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owner: "Privacy & Trust Plane"
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note: "Sensitivity S3 actions REQUIRE a lawful basis entry — enforced by policy rule s3_requires_pdpl_check"
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purpose_register:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 0"
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description: "Named purposes per data class; no secondary use without re-justification"
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owner: "Privacy & Trust Plane"
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retention_schedule:
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status: PARTIAL
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phase: "Phase 1"
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description: "Per-data-class retention periods with automated deletion"
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evidence:
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- "dealix/classifications/__init__.py::SensitivityClass"
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gaps:
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- "Retention NOT YET enforced in DB — requires Alembic migration + scheduled job"
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target_defaults:
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leads_S1_inactive: "24 months"
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leads_S2_disqualified: "12 months"
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leads_S3_personal: "per purpose + lawful basis"
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proposals_S2: "7 years (commercial record retention)"
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audit_logs: "7 years"
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evidence_packs: "7 years (linked to decisions)"
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breach_response:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 1"
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description: "Breach detection → triage → 72-hour SDAIA notification per PDPL"
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owner: "Security + Legal"
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linked_runbook: "dealix/masters/incident_rollback_runbook.md"
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consent_and_notice:
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status: PARTIAL
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description: "Consent capture + transparent notice where lawful basis is consent"
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evidence:
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- "api/routers/leads.py accepts intake payload only via explicit opt-in source"
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gaps:
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- "Consent receipt emission not yet implemented"
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- "Privacy notice template not yet embedded in intake flows"
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controller_processor_map:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 1"
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description: "For each integration, classify Dealix as controller, joint controller, or processor"
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known_relationships:
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hubspot: "Dealix = controller; HubSpot = processor"
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whatsapp_meta: "Dealix = controller; Meta = independent controller for platform data"
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resend_sendgrid: "Dealix = controller; provider = processor"
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google_calendar: "Dealix = controller; Google = processor"
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calendly: "Dealix = controller; Calendly = processor"
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openai_anthropic_google_groq_glm: "LLM providers — depends on DPA + data residency; S3 data MUST NOT be sent until DPA is in place per provider"
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dpo_assessment:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 0"
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description: "Determine if DPO appointment is mandatory based on SDAIA triggers"
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triggers_checked:
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- "Public entity? — no (commercial)"
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- "Core activity = large-scale S3 processing? — likely YES once customer data at scale"
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- "Core activity = large-scale sensitive data monitoring? — depends on deployment"
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decision: "Appoint a named DPO before first production customer with S3 data"
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sdaia_platform_registration:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 1"
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description: "Register on SDAIA platform if triggered (public entity, core processing, sensitive data)"
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decision: "Assess at first production-scale customer onboarding"
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data_subject_rights:
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status: PLANNED
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phase: "Phase 1"
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description: "Access / correction / deletion / portability endpoints"
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target_endpoints:
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- "POST /api/v1/privacy/data-subject-request"
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- "GET /api/v1/privacy/my-data (for authenticated subject)"
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cross_border_transfers:
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status: PARTIAL
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description: "LLM providers are outside KSA — requires assessment per PDPL Article 29"
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current_controls:
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- "S3 data is NOT sent to external LLMs by default — enforced at pipeline level (TO BE VERIFIED)"
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- "LLM routing prefers GLM for Arabic; cross-border posture documented per provider"
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gaps:
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- "Formal adequacy / contract / approval per PDPL executive regulations"
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# NCA — National Cybersecurity Authority
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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nca_ecc_2024:
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scope: "Essential Cybersecurity Controls — baseline for all Saudi entities"
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posture: "Self-assessed; gap analysis planned Phase 1"
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implemented:
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- control: "2-1 Cybersecurity strategy and policy"
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evidence: "docs/blueprint/master-architecture.md + SECURITY.md"
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- control: "2-3 Cybersecurity governance in SDLC"
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evidence: ".github/workflows/ci.yml security job"
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- control: "2-5 Asset management"
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evidence: "dealix/registers/technology_radar.yaml"
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- control: "2-6 Identity & access management (partial — .env secrets)"
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evidence: "core/config/settings.py (SecretStr)"
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- control: "2-10 Logging & monitoring"
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evidence: "core/logging.py (structlog) + api/middleware.py (RequestIDMiddleware)"
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- control: "2-12 Secure configuration"
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evidence: "Dockerfile (non-root, multi-stage)"
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planned:
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- "2-7 Cryptography standards alignment"
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- "2-8 Secure systems development lifecycle (formal mapping)"
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- "2-9 Network security controls (once deployed)"
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- "2-11 Incident response (runbook Phase 1)"
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- "2-14 Third-party cybersecurity"
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nca_dcc_2022:
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scope: "Data Cybersecurity Controls — extension of ECC for data lifecycle"
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posture: "Designed to align; formal mapping Phase 2"
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implemented:
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- control: "Classification (DCC-1-1)"
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evidence: "dealix/classifications (S0-S3)"
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- control: "Secure design (DCC-1-3)"
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evidence: "dealix/contracts/evidence_pack.py (intended vs actual tool calls)"
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planned:
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- "Encryption at rest for S2/S3 data"
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- "Encryption in transit with modern TLS only"
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- "Key management (Vault in Phase 2)"
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- "Data masking/tokenization for logs containing S2/S3"
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nca_ccc_2024:
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scope: "Cloud Cybersecurity Controls — CSP + CST requirements"
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posture: "Platform is cloud-ready; full mapping before first cloud tenancy"
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implemented:
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- "Non-root container"
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- "Healthchecks"
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- "OIDC for CI to cloud"
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planned:
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- "Data localization posture (tenancy choice per customer)"
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- "Network segmentation (VPC design)"
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- "Customer data boundary enforcement"
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- "Shared responsibility model documented per deployment"
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# AI Governance
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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ai_governance:
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nist_ai_rmf:
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govern:
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- "AI roles & responsibilities defined (blueprint §4)"
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- "Risk tolerance explicit per action classification"
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- "Third-party AI (LLM providers) governed via technology_radar"
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map:
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- "Each agent's context, use-case, and impact documented in docs/agents.md"
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- "Sensitivity / approval / reversibility classified per action"
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measure:
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- "Eval harness (PLANNED Phase 2)"
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- "Tool verification ledger catches hallucinated / wrong tool calls"
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- "Contradiction rate tracked in observability metrics"
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manage:
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- "Policy evaluator ESCALATEs low-confidence high-stakes decisions"
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- "Never-auto-execute list for irreversible actions"
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- "Approval center with TTL"
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owasp_llm_top_10:
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LLM01_prompt_injection:
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posture: "Agents don't execute side effects from LLM responses; NextActions go through policy gate"
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residual_risk: "Medium — LLM might still produce biased recommendations"
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LLM02_insecure_output_handling:
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posture: "Structured outputs validated against Pydantic + JSON Schema; markdown outputs escaped in UI"
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residual_risk: "Low"
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LLM03_training_data_poisoning:
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posture: "Not applicable — we use frontier-model APIs, not custom training"
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residual_risk: "N/A"
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LLM04_model_dos:
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posture: "Per-provider timeouts, retries, fallback chain; rate limiting planned"
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residual_risk: "Medium"
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LLM05_supply_chain:
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posture: "Dependabot weekly; pinned versions; pre-commit checks"
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residual_risk: "Low"
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LLM06_sensitive_info_disclosure:
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posture: "S3 data not sent to LLMs by default; SecretStr wrapping; audit log excludes secrets"
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residual_risk: "Medium (enforcement needs stronger gating)"
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LLM07_insecure_plugin_design:
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posture: "No plugin system exposed; integrations use versioned facade"
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residual_risk: "Low"
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LLM08_excessive_agency:
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posture: "Agents are Observer/Recommender only; external commitments go through approvals"
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residual_risk: "Low (by design)"
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LLM09_overreliance:
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posture: "Confidence + evidence + human-in-loop for high-stakes"
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residual_risk: "Low"
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LLM10_model_theft:
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posture: "N/A — no self-hosted model assets"
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residual_risk: "N/A"
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# Operational responsibilities
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# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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responsibilities:
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compliance_owner: "Privacy & Trust Plane lead"
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security_owner: "Platform Security lead"
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dpo: "TBD — appointment before first production S3 customer"
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review_cadence: "Quarterly; after any material incident; on any regulatory update"
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